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AND THE PRIVATE HosPITAL

On March 2, 1964, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition
to review by certiorari the decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. 1 By declining to review the case the Supreme Court left unaffected2
the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that two private
hospitals which had participated in the Hill-Burton program of federal
hospital assistance3 were sufficiently involved with governmental action,
both state and federal, to bring their conduct within the fifth and fourteenth amendment prohibitions against racial discrimination.4 This deci-

1 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 84 S. Ct. 793 (1964) [hereinafter referred
to as the principal case].
2 A denial of a petition for certiorari simply means that fewer than four members of
the Court deemed it desirable to review the decision. The Court has stated that such
a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding its views on the merits of the
case. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950). See also Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
s Funds for federal aid for construction of hospital and related health facilities
are made available through annual appropriations by Congress. These appropriations
are then allocated among the states and possessions in accordance with a statutory
formula based on population and relative per capita income of the states and possessions.
States wishing to participate must inventory existing facilities, determine hospital construction needs, and develop construction priorities according to federal standards. State
agencies make these inventories and then adopt state-wide plans which are submitted to
the Surgeon General of the United States for approval. Hospital Survey and Construction
Act, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1958).
4 The court also found that portion of the Hill-Burton Act which tolerated "separate
but equal" facilities for separate population groups, and a regulation pursuant to that
portion, unconstitutional. 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 29le(f) (1958); 42
C.F.R. § 53.112 (1960). This aspect of the decision seems clearly correct under Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The
court stated that, because the statute and regulation sanctioned unconstitutional practice,
it was necessary to pass upon their validity in order to make the injunctive relief granted
effective. Principal case at 969.
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sion will probably affect all of the 3,346 private, non-profit hospitals in the
United States and its possessions which have received federal funds for
building ·construction under the Hill-Burton program.Ii
In the principal case a class action was brought in a federal district
court by a group of Negro physicians, dentists, and patients seeking to
restrain the defendant hospitals from denying the use of staff facilities to
Negro doctors and dentists and from refusing admittance to Negro patients.
Both defendants were non-profit hospitals owned and governed by boards
of trustees and duly constituted charitable corporations under state law.
They both participated in the Hill-Burton program,6 and both discrimi•
nated on the basis of race. The district court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss on the ground that no "state action" was present, and denied
the motion by the plaintiffs and the United States7 for summary judgment.8
The plaintiffs and the United States appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, which, sitting en bane, found that there was state
fi. Journal of the American Hospital Association, Guide Issue, Aug. 31, 1963, p. 448. As
of June 30, 1962, there were 2,950 Hill-Burton projects approved for the 3,346 voluntary
non-profit hospitals in the United States. Because some private hospitals have been
engaged in more than one project, this number is somewhat larger than the number of
such hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds; nevertheless, the approximate correlation is
sufficiently close to indicate the vast impact of the holding in the principal case.
As of June 30, 1962, $1,751,204,000 of federal funds was approved for 6,236 projects, the
total cost of which was to be $5,523,280,000. Of these projects 3,286, with a total cost of
$2,112,073,000, were publicly owned. The federal share of the cost of these projects was
$768,937,000, or 36.4%. The hospitals which will be affected by the decision in the principal
case are the private non-profit organizations, for there is no doubt that the activities of
hospitals that are state or municipally owned constitute "state action." See Appendix infra,
6 The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital had received a total of $1,269,950 of HillBurton funds in connection with the construction of a diagnostic and treatment center
and an addition to its general facilities. The Hill-Burton funds constituted approximately
17.2% of the total cost of $7,367,023 of these two projects. The hospital is a large and
successful one with facilities worth millions of dollars and a substantial endowment, and
the government subsidies amounted to a very small portion of the total cost of the hospital
facilities.
The Wesley Long Hospital undertook three projects costing a total of $3,927,385 which
were designed to replace its antiquated general facilities with ,modem ones, to enlarge its
capacity from 78 to 150 beds, and to construct a laundry and a nurses' training school.
It received $1,948,100 of Hill-Burton funds, which is approximately 49.6% of the total
cost of these projects. The ratio of the subsidy to the total value of all of its facilities does
not appear. Principal case at 963, 971.
It is perhaps arguable that construction of a separate laundry or a nurses' training
school with government funds is not adequate reason for bringing the entire hospital
within the scope of the fourteenth amendment. This question was not raised in the
principal case because both defendant hospitals received Hill-Burton funds for the construction of general hospital facilities. However, the court did not indicate that it would
make any distinctions with reference to the type of facilities constructed. Indeed, as long
as the facility constructed is part of the total operations of the hospital, the hospital as a
whole has been aided and there would seem to be no reason for such a distinction.
7 The United States intervened because the proceeding was one in which the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest was drawn in question. 28
U.S.C. § 2403 (1958); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
.
8 Simkins V:• Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
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action, and remanded to the district -court with directions to grant injunctive relief. 0
The decision in the .principal case presents a conflict between two lines
of legal authority which, while ordinarily separate and distinct, are in this
context confusingly intermingled. The first legal development is the expansion of the concept of state action as a federal constitutional concept,
exemplified by the principal case. The second involves a series of state
decisions which have firmly established that, as a matter of state law, a
private hospital has complete discretion to determine who may use its
facilities. 10 These two lines of authority collide in the type of fact situation
involved in the principal case, and it is therefore necessary to determine
what effect the expansion of the concept of state action to include actions
formerly deemed private will have upon a doctrine which has developed
on the basis of state law with little or no regard given to possible federal
constitutional principles. Section one of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.11 That the fourteenth amendment is not a limitation on private action has been considered
settled since the Civil Rights Cases were decided in 1883.12 Three years
before that the Court had stated that "A State acts by its legislative, its
executive, or its judicial authorities," and that when anyone "by virtue
of public position under a State government •.. acts in the name and for
the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the state."18
o Principal case at 969.
10 Edson v. Griffen Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. 1958); West
Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa
582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952); Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159
(1942); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp.
Ass'n, 11 N.Y.2d 205, 182 N.E.2d 393, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1962); Van Campen v. Olean Gen.
Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afj'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219
(1925); Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Khoury v.
Community Memorial Hosp., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962).
11 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment provides that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
This amendment is a limitation solely upon the federal government. Barron v. Mayor
8: City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The Constitution does not contain an equal
protection clause applicable to the federal government. However, the due process clause,
in serving as a restraint on arbitrary legislation, tends to secure equal protection of the
laws. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held that compulsory
racial segregation in District of Columbia schools violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331 (1921);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (dissent).
12 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
13 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880). In a recent decision the Supreme Court,
citing Ex parte Virginia, held that statements by a city mayor and chief of police that the
city would not permit Negroes to seek desegregated service in restaurants were authoritative
acts of the executive, and that the city must therefore be treated as if it had an ordinance
prohibiting such conduct. Although it did not decide the issue, the Court indicated that
such statements, together with the fact of previous arrests of Negroes attempting to obtain
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If the concept of state action had been limited to the official acts of state
officials, it would have been so easy to avoid state action that the fourteenth
amendment would have been largely ineffectual. Thus, a problem which
has plagued the federal courts since 1883 is the determination of when
action by private individuals is to be deemed state action for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment. It was not a long step from official acts of a
state official to the unofficial acts of a state official done under "color of
state authority.'' 14 Similarly, state action was found where a state official,
although in a position to use the authority of his office to prevent action
which resulted in a denial of due process or equal protection, failed to do
so.15 The Supreme Court had no difficulty in finding state action where a
private person acted in a discriminatory manner under compulsion of a
state statute or local ordinance.16 It is only in the past two decades, however,
that it has been recognized that there can be state action where a private
party acts in his private capacity and without compulsion of state law.
The initial extension of the state action concept into the area of wholly
private activity was made in those instances where the private party was
performing a "basic state function.'' 17 Next, when the state, through its
judicial branch, enforced private discrimination, the Court found state
action in the affirmative sanctioning of such discrimination. 18
In addition to the cases which could easily be categorized into the somewhat definitive groups mentioned above, there appeared a number of
lower federal court cases in which state action was found which did not
fit into any category. In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library 19 state action
such service, showed that the owner's action was coerced by the city officials. Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267,278 (1963).
14 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945).
15 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Catlette v. United States,
132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
16 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). In 1963
the Supreme Court reversed criminal trespass convictions of Negroes who refused to heed
the proprietors' orders that they leave the white sections of certain lunch counters. The
Negroes were ordered to leave because of their race, and local ordinances required segregation of the races at such facilities. Adopting the phraseology of its holding in Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Court stated that when a state
has commanded a particular result, it has the power to determine that result and thereby
has "become involved" in it "to a significant extent." Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244,
248 (1963). In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963), the Court reversed
the convictions of two ministers who had aided and abetted violation of a local criminal
trespass ordinance by inciting sit-in demonstrations, stating that there could be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act.
17 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The Terry and Smith cases arose under the fifteenth
amendment, which also requires state or federal action. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
18 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). This
form of state action, however, has not yet been extended to its logical extremes. See Black
v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956). See generally Comment, Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer
on the State Action Concept, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 718 (1956).
19 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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was found in the substantial control exerted by the city through regulatory
requirements attached to large subsidies which it granted to the library.2~
The granting of government aid, however, was apparently not deemed sufficient in the absence of substantial regulatory control.21 Where the Government collusively used a private party as its agent to achieve indirectly a
purpose which the government itself could not constitutionally achieve~
however, such as the leasing of public swimming pools to private parties
to avoid integration, the discriminatory acts of these private parties were
held acts of the state.22 Similarly, where a government undertook to provide a public service on its own property and procured a private party to
operate the service, such as by awarding a restaurant concession in an air
terminal, the conduct of the private party while performing this function
was deemed to be that of the state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, even though the state had not intended that the service be performed
on a discriminatory basis.23 While these decisions cannot be neatly categorized, they indicate that the lower federal courts sensed that there could
be a private-state relationship of such a nature that the acts of the private
party would be acts of the state for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, even though there was no official state action, no formal delegation
of state authority, and no state authorization of the discriminatory acts.
This rather unformed and nebulous feeling was given verbal expression
by the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.2 -t Although the Court declined to give a precise definition of state action,20
it held that a state could become so substantially involved in an otherwise
private activity that that activity would constitute state action even though
the state neither exercised control over it nor gave it direct financial support.26 The Court refused to enunciate a precise formula for determining
20 Id. at 219.
21 Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 524 (4th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959), overruled by Eaton v. Grubbs, 32 U.S.L.
WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April I, 1964); Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 851
(D. Md. 1960); Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C.
1957); Norris v. Mayor & City Council, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
22 City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957) (the successful plaintiffappellee in this case was apparently the same George C. Simkins, Jr. who prevailed in the
principal case); Department of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956);
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948).
23 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Derrington v.
Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D.
Ga. 1960).
2-t 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25 "[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility
under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task,' which 'This Court has never
attempted.'" Id. at 722. The Court also indicated that its decision was limited to the
facts of the particular case. Id. at 726. However, in view of the fact that in the Peterson
case the Court specifically quoted from Burton in framing its decision (see note 16 supra),
it would seem that Burton may now be properly regarded as enunciating a broad rule of
law.
26 The Burton case involved an owner of a restaurant who leased space in a municipal
parking structure and who was found to have violated the fourteenth amendment when
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what constitutes sufficient involvement, and stated that only by sifting the
facts and weighing the circumstances of each case could "nonobvious involvement" of the state in private conduct be attributed its true significance.27 The important elements of the relationship in issue in Burton
which led the Court to find sufficient involvement of the state in the
activities of the privately operated restaurant were the continuous relationship between the parties, the interdependence and the mutual benefits
conferred, the fact that restaurants are normally open to the general public,
the fact that the restaurant was located in a public building and was likely
to be associated by most people with the state, and the fact that the state
could have prohibited the discrimination and did not do so.28
The Burton holding placed in doubt the validity of previous lower court
decisions in which no state action was found because the state did not actually control the actions of the private party.29 Thus, in Eaton v. Grubbs8°
the plaintiffs who had been denied relief in Eaton v. Board of Managers of
James Walker Memorial Hosp. 81 sued the same defendant asking that the
issue of state action be reconsidered because the previous decision had
applied a day-to-day control test instead of considering the totality of the
relationship. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction,
stating that Burton did not enunciate a new principle of law and that,
as stated in Burton, each case was to be decided on its own facts. 82 It
seems difficult to deny, however, that Burton did expand the concept of
state action to include activities which were formerly not included, and
this view has recently received judicial approval. 88 If the group of preBurton cases which had found no state action despite significant state
involvement had been decided after Burton, they probably would have
been decided differently. Significantly, the Burton principle of considering
the totality of the state-private relationship has been used to find state
he excluded Negroes. The city did not encourage the discrimination, but it could have
prohibited it in the lease. The rents were essential to the city's plan to operate the garage
on a self-sustaining basis, and the restaurant depended on the existence of the parking
garage to attract some customers. Also, the restaurant was operated as an integral part of
the public building. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
21

Id. at 722.

28 Id. at 723-25.
29 See cases cited in note 21 supra.
216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April 1, 1964).
261 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959). This case was overruled by Eaton v. Grubbs, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April 1, 1964).
32 Eaton v. Grubbs, 216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963), rev'd, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2523 (4th
Cir. April 1, 1964).
33 After its decision in the principal case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en bane, reversed the decision of the district court in Eaton v. Grubbs. Relying on
its decision in the principal case and upon Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), as well as upon
Burton, the court stated that "a new and independent examination must be made of the
relationship between the governmental bodies and the .•• Hospital.'' The court went on
to find the hospital subject to the fourteenth amendment. Eaton v. Grubbs, 32 U.S.L.
WEEK 2523 (4th Cir. April 1, 1964), reversing 216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
30
31
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action in two recent cases where clearly there would have been none before.
In Hampton v. City of ]acksonville,84 the court found sufficient involvement to constitute state action where a city sold two public golf courses
to private citizens with reverter to the city if they should cease to be so
used. The city had sold the golf courses to the private parties only after
earlier in the litigation an injunction had issued prohibiting the city from
operating them on a racially restricted basis. Indicating that it was irrelevant whether there had been a collateral agreement whereby the private
parties would continue to segregate the golf courses, the court said that
"the only question is a legal one: Do the agreed facts compel the conclusion that the operation of the golf course in the hands of the new owners
continue to be state action within the purview of the XIV amendment?"85
The court felt that the absolute obligation of the private parties to use the
land only as a golf course, enforced by use of the reverter, brought the
activity within the fourteenth amendment even though the daily operation
was not subject to the city's direction. In Smith v. Holiday Inns3 6 discrimination by a private motel was held state action. The court found sufficient
involvement because a state housing authority had cleared a slum area and
redeveloped it, supervising the kinds of buildings constructed. When the
land was conveyed to the private purchasers, the state authority retained
some continuing control by means of restrictive covenants for the breach
of which it had a right of action.
It was on the basis of the Burton standard of analyzing the total relationship of the private party and the state that the court in the principal
case determined that there had been sufficient involvement of the state and
federal governments in the affairs of the defendant hospitals to constitute
state and federal action within the fourteenth and fifth amendments. The
involvement was found in ,the participation of defendants in the massive
public funds available under the Hill-Burton program, the governmental
regulations to which participating hospitals are subject, and the federalstate sharing of a common plan for a proper allocation of available medical
and hospital resources.s1
34 !104 F.2d !120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub 110m. Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911
(1962). In finding state action the court specifically questioned the validity of Eaton v.
Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp. in the light of Burton. "Being unable, as we are, to find any valid distinction between the effect of the lease in the Wilmington Parking Authority case and the sale with a reversionary interest in the Walker
Hospital case, we doubt whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would have
decided the Hospital case as it did had it followed the Supreme Court decision." Id. at 32!1.
SIi Id. at !121.
36 220 F. Supp. I (M.D. Tenn. 196!1).
37 The dissenting judge did not think there was sufficient involvement. He argued
that the program was intended by Congress to be mer'ely a grant and not a regulatory
scheme (60 Stat, 1091 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 291m (1958); Hearings on S. 191 Before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1945)), that the state
commission was not empowered to exercise any regulatory functions (see N.C. G:EN. STAT.
§ 1!11-120 (1958)), that the regulations imposed by the statute were no more than devices
to secure proper use of the money, and that therefore there was no state action. Principal
case at 972-75.
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Notwithstanding the steady expansion of the concept of state action,
which, culminating in the principal case, has finally placed the activities
of many private hospitals within the commands of the fourteenth amendment, the overwhelming majority of state courts have firmly established that
for state-law purposes a private hospital has complete discretion over the
use of its facilities. Two recent cases exemplify the rationales of both the
majority position and the minority view, held only by New Jersey. In
Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center,38 a physician sued for reinstatement
as a member of the courtesy staff of a hospital owned and operated by a
private corporation, and a federal district court in the District of Columbia
held that a private hospital may admit or exclude patients and appoint
or remove members of its medical staff in its discretion. In Greisman v.
Newcomb Hosp. 39 an osteopathic physician sued to force a private hospital
to consider his application for admission to its courtesy staff, but in this
case the Supreme Cou11t of New Jersey held that a hospital, although private
in the sense that it is non-governmental, is sufficiently imbued with a
public aspect that it was subject to public supervision and can not exercise
its power to admit physicians to staff membership arbitrarily or unreasonably.
The majority view, as illustrated by the Shulman case, starts with the
proposition that all hospitals are either public or private. A public hospital
is one owned, maintained, and operated by a governmental unit and supported by government funds. A private hospital is one that is owned, maintained, and operated by a corporation or individual without governmental
participation in its control.40 The distinction has typically been made in
terms of public and private corporations. The most frequently cited formulation of the distinction was made in Van Campen v. Olean Gen.
Hosp.,41 where it was stated that a public corporation is an instrumentality
of the state, founded and owned by the state in the public interest, supported by public funds, and governed by managers deriving their authority
from the state, whereas a corporation organized by permission of the legislature, supported largely by voluntary contributions, and managed by officers and directors who are not representatives of the state or any political
subdivision is a private corporation, al,though engaged in charitable work. 42
The fact that a private hospital may receive donations or subventions from
the government, or compensation for caring for indigent patients, is deemed
to be immaterial.48 Once a hospital has established its character as a private
institution, it is not required to accept any person who demands access to
its facilities, "as there can be no absolute right in individuals to claim the
ss 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963).
39 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
40 Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963).
41 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afl'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925).
42 Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 178, 46 A.2d 298,300 (1946).
43 West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Van Campen v. Olean
Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afl'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E.
219 (1925); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962).
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benefit of its privileges."44 It follows under the majority view, therefore,
that if a private hospital in its discretion excludes a doctor or patient from
the use of the facilities of the hospital, the courts are without authority to
interfere. 45
The Greisman case is a clear statement of the New Jersey view. The
court accepted the public corporation-private corporation distinction enunciated in the Van Campen case. However, it held that a combination of
factors may exist which imbue a private hospital with a public aspect so
that it is subject to the state police power to regulate for the health, safety,
and morals of the public. In Greisman the factors deemed important to
the finding that Newcomb Hospital was imbued with a public aspect were:
it was a non-profit organization dedicated to a vital public use; as such, it
received tax benefits; its funds were in large part received from public
sources and through public solicitation; 46 and it exercised a virtual monopoly in its geographical area. Making reference to the common-law duties
of innkeepers and carriers to serve all comers on reasonable terms47 and
the statutory obligations imposed upon private businesses such as warehouses, insurance companies, and milk distributors,48 the court pointed out
that a state may "upon proper occasion . . . regulate a business in any of
its aspects...." 4° Conceding that hospital officials must be vested with a
large measure of discretion in managing a private hospital, the court stated
that they must remember that such hospitals are operated for the benefit
of the public,50 and that courts would be remiss if they did not intervene
where that discretion is exercised in a manner unrelated to sound hospital
standards and not in furtherance of the common good.51
Although the opinions of the courts following the majority view fail
to make it totally clear,52 it is apparent that when they speak of the ab44 Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 62 (D.D.C. 1963); Levin
v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 180, 46 A.2d 298, !101 (1946); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp.,
210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (1924), afl'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925).
45 See cases cited note IO supra.
46 The cost of a new building for the defendant hospital had been borne by public
subscription, it had received local funds for caring for indigents, it had received charitable
contributions from the Ford Foundation and other similar organizations, and it was
eligible for Hill-Burton funds. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. !189, !192, 192 A.2d
817, 818 (196!1).
47 E.g., Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 50, 148 A.2d l, 2 (1959);
Messenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., !16 N.J.L. 407 (Sup. Ct. 187!1), afl'd, !17 N.J.L. 5!11 (Ct. Err.
&: App. 1874).
48 E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (19!14); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis,
2!1!1 U.S. !189 (1914); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 11!1 (1876).
40 Nebbia v. New York, supra note 47, at 5!16-!17.
50 Supporting this point of view that private corporations serving the public have
higher duties than ordinary private corporations is the virtually unanimous rule that such
corporations cannot contract away their liability for negligence. See Tunkl v. Regents of
the Univ. of Calif., !12 Cal. Rptr. !Ill, !18!1 P.2d 441 (Cal. 196!1).
51 The court also relied heavily upon a prior decision in Falcone v. Middlesex County
Medical Soc'y, !14 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), in which it had declared invalid an
arbitrary membership requirement of a county medical society. Greisman v. Newcomb
Hosp., 40 N.J. !189, !199-40!1, 190 A.2d 817, 822-24 (1963).
52 An exception is West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 29!1 (Fla. 195!1).
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solu~e discretion of the managing officials of a hospital they do not mean
that this discretion could not be subjected :to control by the legislature
under the state police power. Thus, the real distinction between the
majority and minority views would seem to be that the majority view
holds that the legislature alone can exercise control over private hospital
management, while the New Jersey court holds this to be a proper judicial
function. 63
'
Although the rule adopted in New Jersey and the rule set forth in the
principal case overlap jn the sense that both may be applicable to a single
situation, they are nevertheless separate and distinct. Different factual
prerequisites are necessary to invoke the two rules, and the consequences
of their application are different. The New Jersey court in Greisman indicated that the crucial element was the public aspect of the hospital,H
whereas the court of appeals in the principal case was looking for governmental involvement in the activities of the hospital.15 15 In finding a public
aspect, the New Jersey court emphasized the non-profit, charitable nature
of the hospital and the fact that it received a large portion of its funds
from a governmental source or from public solicitation of private persons.l'i6
To find sufficient governmental involvement, however, the court in the
principal case stressed the control exerted by the government over the
hospital, the large amount of government funds involved, and the participation of the hospital in a nationwide plan for allocation of hospital facilities. 57 Also, to the New Jersey court the fact that the defendant was the
only hospital in the area and thus had a virtual monopoly was very
important. 58 Under the reasoning of the principal case this factor would
be irrelevant. Having found that a particular hospital is imbued with a
public aspect, a court in New Jersey may, in the exercise of the state
police power, exert extensive control over the discretion of the hospital
authorities.'59 This is not true under the rule of the principal case; if there
is governmental involvement sufficient to constitute state action, the court
may only prohibit the hospital authorities from exercising their discretion
so as to deny to anyone due process of law or the equal protection of the
53 Even courts adhering to the majority view concede that courts may properly review
claims of arbitrary exclusion that are brought against public hospitals. E.g., Ware v.
Bendikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955); Stribling v. Jolly, 241 Mo. App. 1123, 253
S.W.2d 519 (1953); Alpert v. Board of Governors, 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1955).

Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 397-404, 192 A.2d 817, 821-25 (1963).
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 960 (4th Cir. 1963).
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 396, 192 A.2d 817, 821 (1963).
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963).
Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 402, 192 A.2d 817, 824 (1963).
For example, the court could, under the state police power, regulate the prices
charged by the hospital if it felt they were so exorbitant as to deprive persons of proper
medical care. See cases cited in note 46 supra; cf. Group Health Ins. v. Howell, 40 N.J.
436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963), where the New Jersey court declared invalid a statute requiring
approval of th_e state medical society before a medical insurance company could be
licensed to do business in the state where the membership of the medical society interlocked with the membership of the board of directors of the only medical insurance
company in existence in New Jersey.
54

55
56
57
58
59
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laws. The extent of judicial control over the hospital authorities is
thus substantially narrower than that permitted under the New Jersey !llle.
Considering the state cases60 in conjunction with the principal case, it
is necessary to realize that the state cases have been decided on the basis
of state law concerning the rights and privileges of corporations; 61 the
rights and duties of the parties under the federal constitution were not
considered. However, as illustrated by the principal case and the Hampton.
and Holiday Inns decisions, the principle of Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority is broad and capable of a variety of applications. Consequently,
an application of the Burton test to the facts of many of the state-law cases
would have resulted in finding state action. Any time the activities of a
hospital, which under state law is a private hospital, are found to corisijtute
state action, the right-privilege distinction on which the state cases have
turned, although still relevant for purposes of state law, would no longer
matter; whether admission to the facilities of a private hospital is a right
or a privilege under state law is irrelevant to whether there is a protectible
interest under federal constitutional law. It is true that in Hayman v.
Galveston62 the Supreme Court of the United States held that use of
hospital facilities is a privilege and not a constitutional right. However, in
virtually every case where a claim of discriminatory exclusion or expulsion
is brought against a private hospital, whether by a physician or a patient,
the basis of the claim will be action which was arbitrary or unreasonable.
If the claimant had attained some sort of permanent position in the hospital before the complained of action occurred, such as having been appointed to the medical staff, he could rightfully claim that he had· been
deprived of a valuable interest, cognizable as property, without due process
of law. However, if the court refused to consider that interest as property
or if the claimant had merely been excluded, he could justly claim that an
arbitrary and irrational standard had been applied, depriving him of the
equal protection of the laws. Thus, whether he has a right or merely a
privilege he will have an interest protectible under the fourteenth amendment, and the only purpose of the right-privilege distinction will be to
determine whether the claimant is entitled to relief under the due process
or the equal protection clause.63
•
60 Henceforth the state cases will be considered without regard to the split of authority.
If a plaintiff in New Jersey proceeds under state law and the actions complained of are
found to be arbitrary, the suit will be decided on the basis of state law. If the actions are
found not to be arbitrary under state law, the fourteenth amendment will have the same
ramifications as in all majority jurisdictions.
61 Occasionally a state court will confuse matters by citing Hayman v. Galveston, 273
U.S. 414 (1927), in reaching its decision according to state law. That case held that use of
hospital facilities is a privilege, not a constitutional right, although it might be a denial
of equal protection if a public hospital arbitrarily excluded persons from the use of its
facilities. See Edson v. Griffen Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. ~958).
02 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
03 The right-privilege distinction is important in situations where a plaintiff is not
able to argue that he had •been denied equal protection of the laws, but can .only claim
that he has been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law: In such
situations the idea that a privilege once granted may sometimes be protected under the
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The key question, therefore, is whether there is sufficient state action
to bring the conduct of the private hospital within the prohibitions of the
fourteenth amendment. 64 In many situations the question will be answered
by the principal case, which, while following the Burton approach of
examining the total relationship, extends its outer limits by expanding
the notion of what constitutes sufficient involvement. This extension is
not a disturbing one, however, for when a substantial amount of public
funds is granted to a private organization to aid it in its performance of
a public service it would be inequitable if that service were not available
to everyone on an equal basis. 65 In Cooper v. Aaron66 the Supreme Court
emphatically stated that state support of segregated schools "through any
arrangement, management, funds or property could not be squared with
the fourteenth amendment." 67 This principle ought to apply with equal
force to any other public function performed by a private organization,
and it certainly is appropriate to a function so basic to the existence of the
state as the preservation of the health of the public. 68 Furthermore, since
state support of unreasonable discrimination cannot be squared with the
fourteenth amendment, it is all the more distasteful when, in violation of
the fifth amendment, the federal government, through such programs as
the Hill-Burton Act, indirectly supports discrimination. By striking down
an instance of discrimination in which both state and federal governments
were involved, the decision in the principal case has taken an important
step in making the guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
realities for persons unreasonably denied the use of private hospital facil• •
69
ities.
Mary Mandana Long
fourteenth amendment would be of significance. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). In many of the
state cases the plaintiffs were asking for reinstatement of a privilege previously held rather
than the granting of a new privilege. The notion that a privilege once granted may not be
taken away without due process, however, is not mentioned in any of the private hospital
cases. It was recognized in Alpert v. Board of Governors, 286 App. Div. 542, 145 N.Y.S.2d
534 (1955), which involved a public hospital.
Or else sufficient federal action to bring it within the fifth amendment.
Cf. Steir v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
358 U.S. I (1958).
Id. at 19.
Cf. cases cited in note 17 supra.
The extension of judicial control over the activities of private hospitals would be
complete if a proposition analogous to that advocated by Judge Skelly Wright in relation
to higher education were adopted. In Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F.
Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), Judge Wright granted on other grounds the motion of Negro
plaintiffs who sought admission to Tulane, but pointed out that, in view of the great
public interest in education and the fact that private colleges perform a public function,
there is no school or college so "private" as to escape the reach of the fourteenth amend•
ment. After Judge Wright was transferred to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, however, a motion for a new trial was granted by his successor on the ground
that summary judgment was inappropriate because the question of "substantial" involvement is a matter of degree and must be tried on the merits. 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.
1962), afj'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962). Upon retrial it was held that private universities
and colleges are not subject to the fourteenth amendment prohibitions. 212 F. Supp. 674
(E.D. :ta. 1962).
64
65
66
67
68
69

APPENDIX
The following table shows the number of voluntary non-profit hospital projects, the
total cost, the federal share of the cost, and the percentage of the total cost which is paid
for by federal funds on a state-by-state basis:
Federal Share as
Cost (in thousands of dollars)
Percentage of
Number of
State
Total Cost
Federal Share
Projects
Total
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Puerto Rico
U.S. and Possessions
Total

$ 47,005

$ 22,411

44
37
108
IO
27
77
46
25
95
3
13

8,648
29,605
25,888
169,625
51,908
82,599
7,705
16,597
55,505
16,547
11,397
8,645
221,798
76,191
64,425
49,784
48,303
41,905
35,164
97,927
157,901
117,062
64,991
11,245
93,592
16,590
44,383
3,200
26,304
104,774
19,117
318,925
75,249
25,292
177,242
39,515
43,391
328,081
48,736
10,143
21,493
32,813
147,770
8,840
19,301
91,327
56,030
40,556
88,586
1,478
10,609

2,411
9,178
13,751
42,255
11,971
11,381
1,727
3,746
16,745
6,264
4,294
2,669
47,535
21,615
19,668
14,035
23,056
14,833
12,096
17,718
32,225
35,232
18,916
5,955
30,793
5,387
12,124
1,221
8,540
25,273
6,793
77,592
31,076
8,337
45,901
13,539
12,599
92,450
7,480
5,111
7,828
13,326
41,709
3,397
6,692
35,995
14,791
16,635
28,868
517
6,606

47.6
27.9
31.0
53.3
24.9
23.1
13.8
24.1
22.6
30.2
37.8
37.6
30.9
21.4
28.4
28.3
28.1
47.8
35.3
34.4
18.1
20.4
30.1
29.1
53.6
32.9
32.5
27.2
38.1
32.5
24.1
35.5
24.4
41.3
33.0
26.0
34.2
29.0
28.2
15.4
50.6
36.4
40.5
34.9
38.5
34.6
39.4
36.4
40.8
32.6
34.5
62.3

2,950

$3,411,307

$982,267

28.8

39
IO
38
26
100
39
80
9
16
56
18
12
20
126
50
63
46
51
40
50
55
142
103
56
15
62
35
56
6
49
75
30
187
132
44
130
61
57
205
41
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